I Introduction
In 2012, scientists nationwide celebrated Venning J's decision in New Zealand Climate
Science Education Trust v National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research Ltd
(NIWA's case). 1 The case was brought by climate change sceptics questioning the methodology used by the National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research (NIWA) to compile data indicating that New Zealand's temperature had risen over the last century.
The New Zealand Climate Science Education Trust (the Trust) sought judicial review of NIWA's decision to publish the data; however, having dismissed much of the Trust's evidence, the judge found in NIWA's favour. This result, scientists believed, demonstrated judicial willingness to uphold scientific research processes, forcing "those wanting to challenge widely-agreed scientific findings to do so honestly and openly in scientific forums". 2 They were wrong. In reality, the High Court had ensured its own ability to 1 [2012] review research compiled by Crown Research Institutes (CRIs). 3 A requirement that courts be "cautious" when interfering with specialist bodies' findings is all that now prevents judges from intervening in scientific research. 4 In this paper, I argue that this is insufficient. Instead, CRIs' decisions should be reviewed only in cases of "fraud, corruption or bad faith." 5 In Part III, I agree with Venning J that NIWA's decisions were public and thus within jurisdiction for judicial review. Despite exaggerating the decisions' impacts on individuals and the lack of alternative relief, the judge does not deserve criticism for considering NIWA's institutional characteristics.
New Zealand Climate Science Education Trust v National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research Ltd
However, the unsuitability of court processes to addressing matters of science, as demonstrated in Part IV, cannot be ignored. Problems surrounding the adversarial system, inexpert judges and often-partisan expert witnesses make the Court ill-equipped to resolve scientific issues. In Part V, I examine two possible responses: non-justiciability and partial justiciability, otherwise known as deference. Non-justiciability is rejected for allowing scientists behaving fraudulently to escape scrutiny. However, Venning J's formulation of deference is insufficient to protect the research process's integrity. I instead advocate for review only in cases of flagrant impropriety.
II Out of the Lab and into Litigation: NIWA's case
differing climates as well as site-specific factors such as shelter from trees and movement of weather stations. 9 The Trust objected to NIWA's method of adjustment, similarly criticising the eleven-station series (11SS) which corroborated the 7SS, and the review NIWA conducted after the Trust's initial complaint.
10

A Availability and Standard of Judicial Review
The initial issue was whether judicial review was available. Venning J determined that it was, having considered NIWA's statutory origin, its obligation to undertake research benefitting New Zealand, and the retention of its shares by responsible ministers. 11 The judge also reasoned that as NIWA's research may influence government policy, its actions may affect citizens' rights. 12 Furthermore, unlike cases involving State-owned Enterprises (SOEs), plaintiffs could not seek private law remedies if judicial review were denied.
13
Thus, Venning J concluded that judicial review was available as NIWA's functions are public, not commercial. 14 In contemplating the appropriate standard of review, Venning J held that courts should be "cautious" when examining the work of specialists "acting within their own sphere of expertise". 15 Thus, "less intensive review" is appropriate where the Court feels unable to decide between scientific opinions. 16 The Trust therefore needed to demonstrate that the decision-making process was defective or "clearly wrong in principle or in law" before the Court would intervene.
17
B The 7SS
Having dismissed much of the Trust's evidence as non-expert opinion, the judge rejected all complaints about the 7SS. 18 These included that NIWA failed to consider "recognised scientific opinion", using methods to account for movement of monitoring sites described in a 1990 thesis, rather than the 1993 paper the Trust endorsed. 19 This, the Trust claimed, 9 Ibid. 10 NIWA's case, above n 1, at [11] . 11 At [20] , [21] and [26] . See also Crown Research Institutes Act 1992, s 5. 12 At [27] . 13 At [34] . 14 [32] [33] . 15 At [36] and [41] . 16 At [44] . 17 At [48] . 18 At [49] [50] [51] [52] [53] [54] and [116] . 19 At [56] .
breached NIWA's obligation to "pursue excellence", which the judge found to be enforceable, 20 as well as constituting a failure to consider mandatory considerations, unreasonableness and a mistake of fact.
21
Venning J is clear that, while he does not wish to interfere with scientific debates, the Court will determine factual disputes. 22 Thus, he would not resolve the parties' conflict over whether the 1993 paper contained the definitive methodology for such calculations.
23
This was in any case rendered irrelevant by the Court's determination that NIWA had effectively used the 1993 paper's approach. 24 The judge further found that NIWA met its obligation to consider "accepted scientific practices and opinions". 25 An argument that NIWA made a mistake of fact by not appreciating that the warming trend observed was due to the movement of weather stations to warmer sites was also dismissed as NIWA's contrary explanation was "credible and understandable". At [113] . 27 At [138] [139] . 28 At [120] . 29 At [137] . 30 At [180] [181] [182] [183] [184] . 31 At [145] . 32 At [151] .
but generating the same results strengthened the claim that the 7SS was robust.
33
Arguments that NIWA should not have compared particular sites and that data was used from sites sheltered by trees or buildings or impacted by urban heat island effects (resulting from cities being warmer than surrounding countryside as buildings and concrete retain additional heat) were dismissed as issues of science.
34
Thus, the Trust's arguments were rejected entirely. However, that they were even considered sets a precedent which should concern all associated with CRIs. Whilst the following parts support Venning J's determination that NIWA's decisions were within the Court's jurisdiction for judicial review, they also examine why his attempts at deference had the opposite effect and why review of scientific research should be severely restricted. available. However, Venning J's overall conclusion that NIWA was amenable to review is correct. Criticism of his institutional approach is unfounded.
III
A Have individuals' rights been affected?
A key element of 'publicness' and thus jurisdiction is whether a decision affects private individuals' rights. I contend that NIWA's decisions did not. 40 Venning J determined that NIWA's research "may be used in developing Government policy" and thus may "adversely affect…rights and liabilities". 41 By contrast, in the United States, "agency science" is reviewed, albeit with great deference. 60 However, agency science differs significantly from NIWA's "pure research science". 61 Its purpose is to fulfil legal obligations to allow implementation of policy decisions, leaving it open to abuse as government and interest groups heavily influence outcomes, timetables and funding. 62 Former agency employees report that lawyers and policymakers deliberately manipulate and distort research outcomes. 63 Thus, apparently scientific decisions are actually a science-policy hybrid. 64 In contrast, CRIs, although
Crown entities, are not in thrall to the Government, instead producing research for New
Zealand's benefit, rather than for the ruling party. 65 As the resulting policy decision may be reviewed, I contend that comprehensive judicial review of NIWA's decisions is unnecessary. Plaintiffs should not be allowed to challenge scientific research through both decisions to publish and the eventual policy decision. This would not only waste court time and resources, it undermines the finality of the Court's ruling. Arguably, it is more efficient to address problems with research before policy decisions are taken to avoid the same issue arising regarding multiple regulations.
However, this presupposes any policy decision will be made based upon that research alone.
Non-legal remedies
Plaintiffs might also pursue non-legal options, such as publishing papers rebutting NIWA's research in well-respected journals. The principal control on scientific research comes after publication, when other scientists may scrutinise results and publish dissenting papers. While peer review attempts to ensure only quality research is published, it is not infallible. 66 Less robust findings might not appear in major journals, but still be accepted by lesser known publications. 67 Some peer reviewers may also favour particular 
C Has a public decision-making power been exercised?
Determining whether NIWA has exercised a public decision-making power is problematic as, while the above suggests that its decisions had no "real practical" public consequences,
NIWA is undoubtedly a public body. 72 Cases examining a decision's 'publicness' may be categorised as institutional, which examine whether the responsible institution is a public body, or functional, which focus on the decision itself. 73 Venning J employs the former approach, highlighting NIWA's establishment under the CRI Act, which dictates that research "be undertaken for the benefit of New Zealand". 74 Further, he notes its public funding and accountability to a responsible minister.
75
Ferrere criticises Venning J's institutional approach, arguing that the focus should have been on the nature of the decision. 
D Summary
Ultimately, there is no right answer as to whether NIWA's decisions are public or not as 'publicness' is not "like redness -a characteristic that can simply be observed." 84 The lack of harm to individuals and availability of other remedies do not conclusively exclude the Court's jurisdiction. 85 The trend since Datafin has been towards a contextually functional, not merely a functional, approach. Venning J was thus justified in considering NIWA's public attributes and concluding that its decisions were within jurisdiction. However, this does not mean that the contrary arguments explored above should be disregarded. Instead, these lend support to the arguments for non-or partial justiciability traversed in Part IV, and ultimately to my conclusion that review should be limited to cases of flagrant impropriety. 
A The adversarial system
The adversarial system sees advocates relentlessly supporting their party to ensure that both sides' best arguments are considered. This contrasts strongly with the scientific approach of posing a hypothesis to see if the academic community can disprove it. 87 Both methods have adapted to meet different objectives. Whilst science is the dispassionate search for truth, the law also seeks fairness.
88
A clear example of the conflict between scientific and adversarial methods, although not court-based, is the climate change debate. The scientific community has long agreed that anthropogenic climate change is occurring, having rigorously tested this hypothesis. The only disagreements concern the precise magnitude of change, whether 'tipping points' exist and the sensitivity of the Earth system to changes in greenhouse gas concentrations. 136 The Wednesbury test which requires a decision "so outrageous in its defiance of logic…that no sensible person…could have arrived at it" is falling from favour, but judges remain anxious not to usurp the decision-maker's role as finder of fact. 137 Such high thresholds will never be satisfied when there is any scientific dispute on the matter, as there was in NIWA's case. Furthermore, to understand the differences between scientific methodologies often requires considerable training so the majority of "sensible" people could not be expected to distinguish between them.
The innominate or Guinness ground is perhaps the most far-reaching in judicial review, leaving much to the Court's discretion. It only requires that something has "gone wrong of a nature and degree which [requires] the intervention of the Court". 138 Some judges consider it merely a repetition of the principle that courts are not confined to existing grounds of review; 139 others view it as a distinct ground. 140 However, in cases like NIWA's, the arguments made above might be rehearsed, demonstrating first that judicial intervention is not required, as either individuals' rights have not been affected or complainants have other forms of redress. 141 Secondly, this part has raised serious questions about whether a dispute involving scientific research is of such a nature that the Court should intervene, due to issues surrounding the adversarial process and judicial expertise.
E Summary
This part has demonstrated that strong arguments exist that the Court's personnel and processes are ill-equipped to resolve scientific issues. The adversarial system is unsuited to addressing polycentric decisions, whilst judges lack fundamental scientific knowledge and expert witnesses may not overcome this deficit. Even potential solutions such as appointing expert panels or reserving complex cases for scientifically-trained judges are problematic. Thus, powerful arguments exist that judicial review should be excluded completely through a finding of non-justiciability or a deferential standard applied (partial justiciability). Part V will explore why the latter is preferable.
V Definitely deference: solutions to the problem of judicially reviewing scientific research.
In this part, I examine how the problems with the adversarial system, judges' lack of training and expert witnesses explored above might be minimised. While non-justiciability may prevent judicial interference, it bucks the current trend towards increased scrutiny of public decision-makers and may allow CRIs acting fraudulently to escape consequences.
However, something more than the deferential standard Venning J applied is needed as 
A Non-justiciability
Whilst declaring scientific research matters to be non-justiciable would certainly protect the research process from judicial interference, it is problematic. Such a finding would run counter to New Zealand's trend towards increasingly intensive review. 142 Courts are unwilling to leave public power unchecked, perhaps reflecting greater demand amongst ordinary New Zealanders for accountability in the public sector. 143 Even those answerable to the public through elections may only escape review when addressing matters of high policy or national security. 144 CRIs would appear out-of-place on the list of decisionmakers protected by non-justiciability.
Moreover, non-justiciability would protect any decision to publish by CRIs, even if it were fraudulent or corrupt. This is particularly troubling given taxpayer dollars are involved.
Furthermore, aside from public and professional condemnation and employment consequences, New Zealand has no mechanism for addressing such behaviour. 145 Indeed, only 11 countries worldwide do. 146 Of these, the Danish Committee on Scientific
Dishonesty is most comprehensive although limited to public health research. 147 The committee comprises 14 members with "science expertise" but is chaired by a High Court judge. 148 In addition to preventative work, it investigates falsification and distortion of results, plagiarism and inappropriate authorship credit. 149 It is beyond the scope of this paper to determine the need for such a body in New Zealand. However, in its absence, courts should be able to sanction the worst offenders. Thus, decisions such as NIWA's
should not be declared non-justiciable.
B Deference or partial justiciability
Whereas courts "have remained alert to situations of non-justiciability," the exercise of deference or its opposite, 'hard look review', is somewhat contentious in New Zealand.
150
Deference or partial justiciability involves reviewing less intensively, for example by declining to examine certain matters or requiring a higher level of proof. 151 Some judges, including Elias CJ, strongly oppose varying the intensity of review. 152 Others have wavered, with Hammond J applying a 'hard look' in New Zealand Public Service Association Inc v Hamilton City Council, before declaring such spectra unfeasible. 153 Part of their concern is that deference suggests judicial obsequiousness or the Court's failure to properly fulfil its supervisory role. 154 162 However, in doing so, the judge is deciding for the scientific establishment that there remains a debate and no 'best' methodology exists for such cases. 163 Here, this was probably true, with NIWA's expert citing journal articles describing multiple valid methodologies. 164 However, judges may occasionally make the wrong decision and find there is on-going scientific debate when almost all experts are in agreement or vice versa.
Second, Venning J states that "less intensive review…is appropriate" but fails to implement a deferential standard. 165 Both the judge and parties accept that NIWA must consider the "current state of knowledge". 166 Thus, the Court must make a scientific judgment as to what this represents. The judge also makes no comment as to whether "officially recognised scientific opinion", the Trust's preferred standard, actually exists.
He instead leaves it open for later courts to apply such a standard and mistakenly influence science. Furthermore, in saying that the Court will be "cautious" when addressing matters of science, Venning J does not rule out the Court openly intervening when it believes it may "definitively adjudicate on scientific opinions".
167
Additionally, as Ferrere notes, Venning J's attempt to introduce deference is ineffective. 168 His requirement that the decision be "clearly wrong" before courts intervene actually equates to "a decision outside the permissible boundaries to the exercise of...discretion".
169
Since this is the normal standard applied in judicial review cases, Venning J's formulation allows later courts to scrutinise scientific research as they would any other decision.
170
NIWA's case also highlights the blurred boundary between fact and science. Venning J will intervene in factual arguments, although the threshold for finding mistakes of fact is high. 171 However, he will not (purposely) interfere in scientific debates, providing an incentive for plaintiffs to portray issues as mistakes of fact rather than scientific disagreements. Furthermore, judges may not always satisfactorily distinguish between factual and scientific issues, particularly as science is the search for facts, leading to a confusing overlap. If judges cannot reliably locate the boundary, the unwary may inadvertently judge science or fail to judge facts.
The Trust's complaint that the methodology used in NIWA's review was "flawed, unprecedented, outdated and unpublished" illustrates this difficulty. 172 Whilst the judge considered this a scientific matter and thus deferred to NIWA, it might equally well be argued as a matter of fact as it could be determined whether a method is "unprecedented, The issue of counsel taking advantage of the difficulties inherent in distinguishing science from reviewable matters is known in US literature as the "science charade". 174 As judges will defer to expert bodies on scientific matters, agencies creating science-based policy have allegedly portrayed "bad policy decisions as reasoned scientific analysis".
175
Meanwhile, plaintiffs try to argue scientific matters as policy decisions to encourage review. 176 Such arguments may succeed improperly where judges lack scientific knowledge. Parties in the US already "race to the courthouse", hoping to be heard by 170 Ferrere, above n 76, at 381. 171 See Part IVD. 172 NIWA's case, above n 1, at [152] . 173 At [165] . 174 Clark, above n 60, at 346. 175 At 342. 176 At 346.
particular judges who will be more or less willing to involve themselves in issues of science. 177 Furthermore, scientists may be reticent to publish knowing that judges may scrutinise their work, particularly if their results are controversial. The mere existence of a court case may impact their reputations and employment prospects, especially given the cost to employers.
Indeed, NIWA spent over $100,000 defending itself against the Trust's allegations, although it was later awarded costs. 178 The resultant unwillingness to publish would be problematic as publishing and garnering critique from peers is vital to the scientific method. Alternatively, scientists may expend excessive time and resources gathering more data and conducting multiple analyses to ensure they will not be criticised by the Court.
Plaintiffs also favour "blunderbuss attacks", with counsel criticising as many aspects of the science as possible, hoping that one argument at least will be accepted. 179 Such tactics potentially distort the focus of science by forcing scientists to consider and address any minor point which might be scrutinised in court. Restricting review to cases of flagrant impropriety surmounts the arguments raised in the three parts above. It acknowledges the improbability of individuals being harmed by decisions such as NIWA's. However, it provides a legal remedy should scientists behave improperly. It also recognises the risk that judges might inadvertently make decisions of science, which would be particularly harmful given the unsuitability of the adversarial system and indeed, judges themselves to determining such issues. Instead, it places the Court squarely within its usual range of operations, examining the facts to determine whether fraud has occurred. In doing so, it reassures the public that CRIs acting inappropriately will be held accountable.
180
D The flagrant impropriety standard
E Summary
Having examined the arguments for both non-and partial justiciability, I conclude that "fraud, corruption or bad faith" is the optimal standard of deference when reviewing to act improperly that is almost unparalleled in the public sphere. However, Venning J's standard of deference allows judges to unintentionally determine scientific issues. In attempting to lower the intensity of review, he in fact allowed later courts to be anything but deferential. His decision also ignored the significant problem of the blurred boundary between fact and science which may allow unwary judges to decide matters of science.
Scientific advancement might be delayed as scientists endeavour to ensure their decisions are above reproach, or forego publishing entirely. Thus, review should be restricted to cases of flagrant impropriety.
VI Conclusion
This paper proposed an alternative standard of judicial review in cases of scientific research to that adopted by Venning J in NIWA's case. Whilst the judge was right to find NIWA's decisions to be within the Court's jurisdiction, its decision to publish did not directly impact individuals' rights. A finding that research could impact reputations presumes that the public would be willing to accept the findings of a single piece of research, despite knowing that science is not infallible. The absence of judicial review would also not leave plaintiffs without redress as they may seek review of any policy decision based upon the scientific research. This already occurs in the European Community Courts. Furthermore, if plaintiffs have a valid scientific point, they could ask a reputable scientist to write a paper and have it published in a credible journal, and if the scientific community agrees, the initial conclusion would be discredited. However, Venning J was still justified in determining that NIWA's decisions were within the Court's public law jurisdiction as courts do not apply a purely functional approach. Thus, NIWA's nature as a public institution meant that its decisions may be considered public.
However, the adversarial system may not appropriately address scientific issues given its incompatibility with the scientific method. Expert witnesses appearing in court tend to be those outside the mainstream of scientific opinion, selected primarily for their ability to support the client's arguments. Moreover, judges lack the expertise to become involved in scientific decisions, with US studies revealing very low scientific proficiency in their judiciary.
If these problems were remedied by finding NIWA's decisions to be non-justiciable, scientists might escape scrutiny when acting fraudulently or in bad faith. Thus, partial justiciability, or deference, is preferable; however, Venning J's formulation enables inexpert judges to determine matters of science. The judge himself inadvertently draws conclusions as to science, and his attempt at deference is unsuccessful as the standard he sets is no different from usual. Furthermore, scientific judgments are necessary to determine whether the required "current state of knowledge" has been considered. There is also a risk that counsel may encourage the confusion of fact and science, as Venning J is prepared to review matters of fact but will not intervene in scientific disputes. In addition,
should scientists become concerned that judges lacking scientific expertise will criticise their work, they may spend excessive time and resources ensuring their research is above reproach. These issues will not be resolved by a low standard of deference. Instead, decisions regarding CRIs' research should be reviewed only in cases of flagrant impropriety or "fraud, corruption or bad faith". This standard protects the research process from non-scientist judges but allows courts to intervene when scientists have acted reprehensibly.
Thus, NIWA's decisions should not have been judicially reviewed as they were. Whilst they fall under the Court's public law jurisdiction, the nature of the Court's processes makes it unsuited to determining such issues, requiring an extremely high level of deference. Instead, the Trust should have utilised non-legal methods or waited and sought judicial review of a resulting policy decision. As to whether these findings might be applied to other cases involving complex scientific evidence, we must conclude, like every good science paper, that more research is needed. 
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